2024-20 The Féile: a Borda border poll
Sunday, July 21, 2024 FÉILE AN PHOBAIL
A REPORT OF A ROLE-PLAY ON PREFERENTIAL DECISION-MAKING
Should majority voting, a cause of the Troubles, be part of the solution?
A BORDA BORDER POLL
A SUMMARY
On Saturday 3rd August, the Féile hosted a role-paly on preferential voting. Participants were asked to suggest what they thought should be an option on a border poll; a total of six options were proposed; those present then cast their preferences on one, some or all six options, either on their mobile phones or on a paper ballot; and sure enough, one option was indeed the most popular. Pluralism is possible.
EILISH ROONEY opened the proceedings, with thanks to Féile an Phobail for hosting a discussion on this permanently topical subject of the border poll. The hour-long seminar was to critique binary voting, to consider preferential decision-making, and then to do a role-play on a multi-option border poll.
INTRODUCTION
As was shown nearly 2,000 years ago, binary voting is unsuitable for any controversy in which there are more than two options ‘on the table’. Indeed, in any democracy which aspires to be pluralist, every controversy is multi-optional… IF the question is asked correctly. For example, the closed question – “Capital punishment, yes-or-no?” – should best be replaced by a more open enquiry – “How should society deal with the convicted murderer?”
In those days of yore, the Greeks knew of only one voting procedure: binary voting, which is either a singleton – “Option X, yes or no?” – or a pairing – “Option X or Y?” With singletons, there might be majorities against every option (as was the case in Brexit); with pairings, however, even if the result requires the casting vote of the chair, there will always be a definite answer.
The early Greek structure of democratic decision-making relied on pairings. It ruled that, if someone(s) proposed a motion – option A – which others perhaps wanted to amend to option B or C (to take a simple example), those concerned should first choose the more preferred amendment – B or C – to get what is called the substantive, and then decided to adopt or reject this: (B v C) v A. In this setting, the democratic process consists of just two pairings:
+ B v C
and then
+ (B v C) v A.
Despite the fact that quite a few multi-option voting procedures have been invented over the centuries, today’s politicians still use binary voting. It suits them. But consider a committee of 12 in which 5 move option A, 4 prefer option B and 3 want option C, and with preferences as shown.
|
PREFERENCES |
Number of Voters |
||
|
5 |
4 |
3 |
|
|
1st |
A |
B |
C |
|
2nd |
B |
C |
A |
|
3rd |
C |
A |
B |
With singletons, there are majorities against everything: 7 don’t want A, 8 vote against B and 9 dislike C. So we try pairings: in this setting, 5 + 3 prefer A to B, while just 4 prefer B to A, so A is more popular than B which we write as A > B. In all
A > B = 8:4
B > C = 9:3
C > A = 7:5
which means
A > B > C > A > B…..
and it goes round and round for ever. It’s called the paradox of binary voting.
So if the debate and the vote is:
(B v C) v A
it works like this:
(B v C) v A = B v A = A
but if the order of voting is changed to
(C v A) v B
the answer will be different:
(C v A) v B = C v B = B
And if it’s
(A v B) v C
the outcome is:
(A v B) v C = A v C = C.
In other words, if there’s a paradox, the outcome depends upon the order of voting. And if there isn’t a paradox while there’s a majority in favour of something which the chair doesn’t like, he/she can always ask everyone to consider other options, split that majority, create a paradox, and adjust the order of voting accordingly. In a word, majority voting is manipulable; secondly, as everyone knows, some politicians are manipulative; and thirdly, many binary votes are indeed manipulated. (And not only in Brexit!)
In a nutshell, majority voting is no good; let us ponder pluralism.
MULTI-OPTION VOTING
There are quite a few decision-making systems (and umpteen electoral systems; but today’s role-play is devoted to decision-making). The systems include plurality voting (which is like the first-past-the-post electoral system); the two-round system TRS, which is used in some referendums (and in French elections); the alternative vote AV, which is STV (without PR); and a points system, the Modified Borda Count MBC (forms of which are used in electoral systems in Nauru and Slovenia).
Consider a slightly more complicated set of 12 + 2 voters now casting their preferences on four options, A, B, C and D.
|
PREFERENCES |
Number of Voters |
|||
|
5 |
4 |
3 |
2 |
|
|
1st |
A |
B |
C |
D |
|
2nd |
D |
C |
D |
C |
|
3rd |
B |
D |
B |
B |
|
4th |
C |
A |
A |
A |
In this setting:
+ plurality voting considers only the 1st preferences, so the winner is A on a score of 5; it’s not a majority, just the largest minority;
+ with TRS, when nothing gets a majority, there’s a second-round majority vote between the two leading contenders, A and B, and if the voters’ preferences stay the same, B now wins on a score of 9… which is a majority – oh good;
+ AV starts with a plurality vote and eliminates the smallest, which is D, and its two votes got to C, for a score line of A-5, B-4, C-5, so that’s the end of B, and its 4 votes go to its 2nd preference which is C, so that’s A-5, C-9, so C now wins on another majority score of 9… oh dear;
+ the MBC is a points system: 4 points for a 1st preference, 3 for a 2nd, add up the points and the option with the most points, or the highest average preference, is the winner, in this instance option D on a score of 40.
In other words, the answer could be anything! A, B, C or D. And each and every outcome would be regarded as only totally democratic!
Of the four methodologies here examined, the MBC is the only procedure which always counts all the preferences cast by all the voters. It is the most accurate.
THE MBC
The rules are as follows: in a six-option ballot:
+ he who casts only one preference gets his favourite just 1 point,
(he says nothing about the other options, so they get nothing);
+ she who casts two preferences gets her favourite 2 points,
(and her 2nd choice gets 1 point);
and so on; accordingly,
+ he who casts all six preferences gets his favourite 6 points,
(his 2nd choice gets 5, his 3rd gets 4, etc.).
The option with the most points is the winner. In effect, the system encourages every voter to state, not only their favourite 1st preference, but also their compromise option(s); and if (nearly) everyone does that, we can calculate the collective compromise.
Which is what politics is all about, they say.
In a six-option poll, not every option will be totally mutually exclusive of every other option. Accordingly, if the runner-up is a very close second, any elements of the runner-up which are compatible with the winning option may then be incorporate into the latter. But given the restrictions of time, such a nuance of the MBC was not even mentioned in today’s seminar,.
THE ROLE-PLAY
A full democratic process would start with a citizens’ assembly or public enquiry, and any motions proposed would be scrutinised in some detail. In today’s workshop, participants were asked only to propose constitutional options, and as long as the suggestion complied with the UN Charter on Human Rights, it was accepted. A total of six were submitted and approved:
Options
+ A A united Ireland
+ B An independent Northern Ireland
+ C A two-part federal Ireland
+ D A four-part federal Ireland
+ E A united Ireland within the Commonwealth
+ F The status quo
The number of ballots, electronic, all full = 5
18 full and 3 partial (each of just 3 preferences) = 21
So the total number of ballots = 26
Total points per full ballot = 6 + 5 + 4 + 3 + 2 + 1 = 21
per partial ballot = 3 + 2 + 1 = 6
The number of full ballots = 23
the number of partial ballots (each of only 3 preferences) = 3.
Total number of points cast in full ballots = 23 x 21 = 483
partial ballots = 3 x 6 = 18
TOTAL = 501
THE RESULTS
+ A A united Ireland 121
+ B An independent Northern Ireland 56
+ C A two-part federal Ireland 100
+ D A four-part federal Ireland 92
+ E A united Ireland within the Commonwealth 81
+ F The status quo . 50
TOTAL 500
CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of the role-play was to demonstrate that preferential decision-making is possible. Ramón Llull spoke about it in 1299; Cardinal Nicholas Cusanus devised the points system which by historical accident is called the Borda Count; Jean-Charles de Borda developed the MBC in 1770 (although many credit him with only the BC); his colleague in l’Académie des Sciences, Le Marquis de Condorcet devised the Condorcet rule – another preferential vote but it relies on pairings; and Thomas Hill produced the AV (or STV) in 1821. Sadly, many politicians (and Napoléon was the first to reject the MBC) prefer the binary vote, not least because it is so easy to manipulate.
What is so difficult to understand, however, is why so many professors of political science and journalists do not critique majority voting with sufficient intensity to stop it being used as a false-flag cause of bitterness and division if not of violence and war… as today in Ukraine, as yesterday in the Balkans and the Caucasus, and as always throughout the Middle East.
TODAY’S ROLE-PLAY
It would have been wiser to inform the participants of the electronic vote; indeed, some might have registered on the www.debordavote.com webpage before the event.
Ideally, a full democratic decision-making process should consist of:
+ a proposed motion;
+ one or more alternative motions; (not amendments to this or that section, but any or many differences of opinion shall be expressed in a complete motion, with any differences from the original highlighted);
+ a debate on each motion, with any changes accepted, only if the original proposer agrees; nevertheless, the debate shall allow for motions to be changed – amended, composited or even deleted – so the total number of options ‘on the table’ may vary;
+ if just one option remains, it may be regarded as the verbal consensus; if not, the chair shall propose a ballot of, let’s say, 4 – 6 options, to represent all options still in contention and, given the agreement of all concerned, move to the preference vote;
+ if the option with the highest average preference score has passed a predetermined threshold, this outcome shall be regarded as binding.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
Majority voting is ubiquitous; it is even in the constitution of North Korea, in article 97; the Russian word ‘bolshevik’ means ‘member of the majority,’ and Rwanda’s genocide started with the slogan ‘We are the majority,’ “Rubanda nyamwinshi.”
The more often the MBC is used, the more likely it will be adopted in the world’s political forums. The more commonplace its name, the more likely its use will be advocated in conventions on human rights; democracy after all is for everybody, not just 50% + 1, and given that the MBC can identify the option with the highest average preference, the MBC is unique in that it is non-majoritarian; the methodology is inclusive, literally! Furthermore, the more widespread is the use of computers, the easier it is to use preferential voting. The software – www.debordavote.com – needs to be updated. And the de Borda Institute needs to be more widely recognised. Maybe the first step is for its ageing executive to be replaced if not purged!
THANKS
For today’s role-play, our thanks go to:
+ Eilish Rooney for her excellent chairing;
+ Bill Rolston and the Féile committee, for the invitation;
+ Gareth Connolly for his technical help;
+ Simon Wood for his electronic collation of the paper ballots;
+ Hannah for her computer skills – they saved the day!
and
+ Tommy Sands, for ending the seminar on the highest of notes!
